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Chronicles of the Continued Egyptian Revolution of January 25, 2011

Celebrations in Tahrir Square after Mubarak’s resignation on February 11, 2011. (Photo credit: Jonathan Rashad)
Note to the Reader

The following text addresses the twin anniversary dates of the January 25, 2011 “Revolution” and the February 11, 2011 resignation of former President Hosni Mubarak.

It is divided into two parts. The first part addresses the “Revolution”, its commemoration, and the Regime’s responses. It is released here as Egypt Update 27. The second part is designed as a more in-depth analysis of the last three years’ events, their legacy, and ongoing contemporary issues.

Egypt Update 28, to be released on Tuesday, February 25, 2014, will compose the second part of this text.
"Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make violent revolution inevitable."

John F. Kennedy, President of the United States of America. Address on the first Anniversary of the Alliance for Progress, reception for the diplomatic corps of Latin American Republics, 1962.

The Third Anniversary of the January 25th Revolution and the February 11th Resignation of Hosni Mubarak

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“The research assistance of Omar Sabry is gratefully acknowledged”
Part I

I. The “Revolution”: A Work in Progress

1. The Egyptian Revolution has been a work in progress for a long time. In 1798 it was fought against the Napoleonic occupation. In 1882 it was against a British invasion. In 1919 it was a major uprising against the British occupiers that led to Egypt’s semi-independence in 1923. In 1956 it was to resist the attack by Great Britain, France, and Israel. By December of that year, Egypt was free from foreign occupation until 1967 when Israel occupied the Sinai. This occupation lasted until 1979. In 1952, a military coup removed the monarchy and established a republic in 1953. Egypt has remained independent since July 1952, but it exists under a dictatorial military regime that has lasted until present day, with only a brief interlude of one year under Mohamed Morsi’s presidency and the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). The interlude ended on July 3, 2013. The military regime that began in 1952 is now firmly in control and likely to officialize that role with the April 2014 presidential election that are very likely to see Field Marshall el-Sisi become president for the next four years (renewable for one more term under the 2014 constitution). In the meantime, democracy will have to wait, as it has since at least 1952. But the Egyptian people’s aspirations for democracy, freedom, and dignity go on, as does their struggle for the attainment of these rights.  

2. By the end of 2010 the economic situation had deteriorated significantly and the abuses of the Mubarak regime had become so blatant as to be intolerable. The 2010 legislative elections were rigged in an open and notorious manner. Public abuses and corruption were not only as rampant as in the past, but were done in a manner that can at best be described as “in your face.” The word on the street was that Mubarak and his clique (shella in Arabic) were dealing with the country and its people like a ızba (private farm) and the people as its indentured
servants. The army was no longer the visible face of these abuses as it had been in the past, since it had receded into the background under Field Marshal Tantawi’s leadership. Instead it was the Ministry of the Interior under Minister Habib el-Adly that became the most visible instrument of political repression and of the protection of the corrupt oligarchy. Pro-democracy opposition had been mounting as of 2005, as did labor unions’. The economic situation grew worse and affected millions who were at or below the level of poverty. The winds of discontent were blowing, but state security remained focused on the MB while totally disregarding the rest of the people for whom they only had disdain. They never imagined what would happen on January 25, 2011, and they were taken totally by surprise. Over the years, a mutual vendetta had formed between the MB and state security, and they never missed an opportunity of doing each other harm. The Mubarak Regime saw a significant increase in the corruption of the ruling oligarchy that the Sadat and Nasser regimes had first allowed to come into being. No longer was the Mubarak oligarchy made only of military and former military personnel, their relatives, friends, loyal politicians, and senior bureaucrats. Instead, they became a growing class of businessmen (and some women) who dominated the economy and public life through corrupt practices. The political establishment institutionalized and legalized abuses of authority and public corruption by developing laws and administrative procedures that facilitated this state of affairs. The greatest profits were made from the sale of publicly owned industries and properties, and by giving highly lucrative concessions for business and other investment projects, including the sale of public lands at symbolic prices. By the time of the 2011 Revolution, it was unofficially estimated that 200 families owned 90% of Egypt’s private sector wealth. In exchange, if one can loosely use that term, the Mubarak regime had eased up on repressing freedom of expression so long as it did not amount to any threat to the existing order, but it strongly controlled the political process (the 2010 elections were openly rigged and only 88 opposition members were allowed to be elected out of 444 open seats).
3. The July 25, 2011 “Revolution” began with an online invitation to a “Day of Rage” protest coinciding with National Police Day. The April 6 Youth Movement and the online page “We are all Khaled Sa‘id,” named after an Alexandrian who was tortured to death by police officers in June 2010 for no other reason their ability to assert this misdeed and not be held accountable. Thousands are believed to have been killed over Mubarak’s 30-year reign with total impunity for the transgressors. The “Day of Rage” called on all Egyptians to join the protest. Wael Ghoneim, at the time a Google marketing executive, was behind the “We are all Khaled Sa‘id” online page, which was one of several calling for public protests and demonstrations.

4. The first demonstration took place at Tahrir Square. The square was filled at times with as many as 400,000 persons while others participated throughout the country. For three weeks on Fridays after the prayers, millions throughout the country would attend demonstrations. In 10 to 15 cities daily, people took to the streets. Three weeks later on February 11, 2011, Mubarak resigned and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) took over. Mubarak was gone, but the regime that he led remained. But for 3 weeks it was an extraordinary sight...
to see the people in unison ask for the basic demands that any people in the world ask for: democracy, freedom, dignity, justice, and a decent life. There was no violence by them, and there was no difference between them. For a few days at Tahrir Square, the protests were reminiscent of the Indian Non-violent Independence Movement led by Gandhi, the American Civil Rights Movement led by Martin Luther King, and the Anti-apartheid movement in South Africa led by Nelson Mandela. Among the major cities that participated in the uprising included Cairo, Alexandria, Suez, Port Said, Beni Sweif, Mansoura and Mehalla. Every day, people from all walks of life came to Tahrir, meaning “liberation” Square. Egyptian expatriates visiting Egypt stayed longer to be part of the happening, as did foreigners and tourists. In the year to come, thousands of individual accounts of the event surfaced in movies, documentaries, short stories, books, articles, and memoirs. Those who lived that extraordinary experience will never forget, and the ideas of democracy, freedom, justice, and human dignity will live on. And one day again there will be another revolution. Let no ruler forget that there is nothing more powerful than an idea whose time has come. The accounts of those who participated in this principled, nationalistic period of Egypt’s history can be described as glorious. It has millions of individual stories that emboldened so many from all walks of life, those from all parts of the country and those from abroad, to take to the streets. This was truly a moment of peaceful “power to the people.” Those who were part of it will never forget the empowerment of spontaneous popular unity, freely and voluntarily expressed, and at times at great personal risk including death, with the knowledge that so many like-minded would join and stand side by side to assert their basic rights of human dignity, freedom from fear or want, and the end to abuse of power and corruption. It is hard to find a similarly peaceful attempt at regime change in modern history that had so much diverse popular support and so much popularity as was the Egyptian Revolution of January 25, 2011.

5. The pro-democracy “Revolution” was quickly co-opted by the MB, who did not originally join it. They waited to see what the military establishment would do. When it became clear that the establishment would not defend
Mubarak and the cronies who rode on his coattails, they joined the “Revolution” and then took it over to win a legislative and presidential election and establish themselves as the rulers of the country. The Morsi government was freely and fairly elected, though Egypt’s silent majority stayed at home and it only took 25% or so of the registered voters to put in place an MB presidency and legislature which in turn proceeded to develop in 2012 a constitution that started to establish a theocratic system of government.\textsuperscript{7} By the end of 2011 the pro-democracy revolution had not only been co-opted by the MB, it had been squeezed at both ends, respectively by the SCAF and the MB, both of whom believed they could live with one another, but not with democracy.\textsuperscript{8}

6. The “Revolution” survived the next three years and on January 25, 2014, pro-democracy activists and others organized massive popular protests in Tahrir Square and elsewhere to commemorate the three-year anniversary of the January 25, 2011 “Revolution.” The date of January 25 had another symbolic meaning since it was “National Police Day.” But for the pro-democracy forces that took to the streets three years earlier to protest police abuse, the date was chosen to symbolize a popular rejection of the repressive police practices that have existed for so longer under the military dictatorship that started in 1952. As is stated above, the 2011 organizers of the massive popular protests were pro-democracy nationalists who were soon joined by people from all walks of life in Egypt. Rich and poor, old and young, men and women, Muslim and Christians all went to Tahrir Square and to other squares in other cities, and to the streets, and through
the social media to express their discontent with the Mubarak regime and to demand regime change. They wanted dignity and justice as well as a decent life. It was an extraordinary, patriotic, and nationalistic movement involving all segments of society, much as was the case during Egypt’s 1919 Revolution against British colonialism. And it was peaceful. Eighteen days later, the regime change occurred and Mubarak resigned. But on the third anniversary, the new face of the ruling “Regime” was not very different from what it was since 1952, particularly since it took back power on July 3, 2013. And on January 25, 2014 an estimated 49 persons were killed, 247 injured and over 1,000 arrested.\(^9\) The security forces made no distinction as to who the demonstrators were and whether they were peaceful or not. They had prepared for the day, as of the early morning of the 24\(^{th}\), when a bomb exploded near the Ministry of Interior. No one was hurt and no damage occurred. The Ministry announced that this was the beginning of the expected “terrorist” campaign of the next day. Thus, the “Regime” had pre-labeled January 25, 2014 a day of “terrorist” activities. Violence did occur, presumably by certain supporters of the MB. Four explosions occurred which caused human harm and material damage.\(^{10}\) They were “terrorist” acts claimed by a group fighting the military in the Sinai, Ansar Beit al-Maqdis (which will be discussed further in Paragraph 7). Those events aside, the protests and demonstrations were mostly peaceful. The security forces, however, did not give these protestors and demonstrators the opportunity to exercise their constitutional
rights and internationally protected rights of peaceful assembly and freedom of expression. These rights were repressed as people were killed, injured, and at least 1,000 persons were arrested on that day. Since July 3, 2014, opposition leaders claim that an estimated 23,000 political activists were arrested by the “Regime.”

Residents of Cairo struggle with the violence of the January 24-25, 2014 anniversary of the “Revolution.” Top – A man carries an injured girl away from one of the blast sites. (Photo credit: Mahmud Khaled/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images) Left – Residents gather outside the damaged exterior of the Museum of Islamic Art. (Photo credit: Tara Todras-Whitehill/New York Times) Below – A crater left by one of the car bombs. (Amr Abdallah Dalsh/Reuters)
II. The Relentlessness of the “Deep State”

7. The term “deep state” is not intended to be derogatory. Instead, it is a reflection of the reality of power relations in Egypt. This is also the case in many countries in the world. There are a number of power and influence centers in Egypt who on different subjects and at different times exercise both their power and influence, sometimes it is for the benefit of the nation, and sometimes it is for the benefit of their cast or group. The term “military establishment,” as I have used it in these Updates, refers to a structure in which the Minister of Defense who is also the Chairman of the SCAF sits at the top. So far, since the 1952 Revolution, that person has been appointed by the President, but with the new 2014 constitution it will be the SCAF who will, for all practical purposes, have the final say so for the period of 8 years. The new constitution provides that the Minister of Defense and head of the SCAF cannot be removed by the President, or any other authority in Egypt, for the next 8 years. Since the military establishment also includes military industries, some of which are purely military while others are in the civilian economic sector (see Egypt Update 19) there is a parallel economic structure within the establishment that is also controlled by the military though it is not directly subject to the authority of the SCAF, but only that of the Minister of Defense. There are two other agencies that could be said to fall within the meaning of the military establishment, namely General Intelligence, and Administrative Control Agency. Both are directly under the President and their respective heads are former military persons (they have to resign their military position before assuming that function) they hold the rank of Minister and since the 1952 Revolution they have always been former military intelligence heads. The General Intelligence Agency consists of 90% former military officers while only 10% are former police officers and civilians. The Administrative Control Agency is 100% former military officers. The Security Forces are another center of power controlled by the Minister of Interior and answerable to the President, though at different times the Security Forces which are to be distinguished from other elements of the Ministry of Interior that deal with public
safety and other police functions has been more or less under the control or influence of the General Intelligence Agency. Thus, to some extent, this independent source of power of the deep state is at times, as is now the case, under the control of the military establishment. Two additional groups supplement both of these. One of them can be referred to as politically influential personalities, whether in office or not, and that includes senior media personalities. The second are a group of business moguls who are more likely to exercise influence than direct power except in economic and financial matters. It is the combination of these four centers of power and influence that constitute the deep state. At different times and with respect to different subjects the alliance between these groups will vary, as will the preponderance of one over the other. At present, the military establishment is the preponderant force that dominates all others.

8. Any democratic society will necessarily be concerned with the existence of non-institutional bodies such as those described above. They will see the power and influence of non-institutional bodies or of institutional bodies using their power and influence outside their specific institutional functions as being undemocratic. The question in the case of Egypt is whether or not the deep state has, since January 25, 2011, acted in the best interest of the nation or not. It is this writer’s conclusion that strategically, it has, though it made a number of tactical errors particularly in connection with repressive policies described in Updates 24, 25, and 26, as well as in this Update and the forthcoming Update 28 (Part II). Strategically, the military establishment saved the country from a civil war in January – February 2011 by facilitating the resignation of then President Mubarak. It allowed for the exercise of what is probably the first free and fair elections occurring in Egypt since 1952, which led to the election of then President Morsi. It allowed the elected President and the MB dominated legislature to run the country. And, when Morsi and the MB’s failures became obvious, the military establishment and public opinion coincided. Admittedly, the military establishment helped orchestrate the June 30, 2013 popular revolutionary movement for the removal of President Morsi, it nonetheless genuinely coincided
with popular aspirations. Technically, it was a military coup, but it was one based on popular revolutionary legitimacy. Since there was no other constitutional means which could remove the elected president from office. Admittedly, also, the military establishment is strongly pushing for Field Marshal el-Sisi to become the next President, but that too coincides with popular support and therefore has popular legitimacy.

9. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), chaired by Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi since many years preceding the 2011 “Revolution,” assumed responsibility for the country’s affairs as of the moment that Mubarak resigned on February 11, 2011. The SCAF, under Tantawi’s leadership, took upon itself the assumption of all legislative authority, without any basis in the applicable 1971 Constitution. As I stated on February 11, 2011 (after Mubarak
resigned) in Egypt Update 2, it was too soon for the pro-democracy forces to have rejoiced that Mubarak had resigned. My skepticism, unfortunately, proved to be justified. The SCAF acted as Egypt’s sole power custodian and co-opted the revolutionary movement in a way that ensured it would remain in control for years to come (as will be discussed in the forthcoming Part II of this work on February 25, 2014) and retain its far reaching political powers, social influence, and economic privileges (see Egypt Update 19). By February 2011, democracy and the Egyptian people lost out to the apparent compromise between the military establishment and the MB. It only took six months for the military to realize that what they thought was a possible *modus vivendi* with the MB could not be so, since the latter were irrevocably committed to the establishment of an MB based theocracy in which Egypt, as a nation, would be subsumed in a larger Islamic nation. One is tempted to add, without being too conspiracy-minded, that Tantawi and the SCAF anticipated most of the outcomes that subsequently occurred for the following reasons:

- Popular revolutionary fervor was high after January 25, 2011 and increasing. The military could not risk going against it without killing thousands of people. If they did that, they would loose all legitimacy and hope to govern the country. Thus, Mubarak had to be ousted and some apparent regime-change was necessary in light of the existing corruption and of Mubarak’s plans to have his son Gamal inherit the presidency. Both of these were unacceptable to the SCAF. The assumption of the presidency by Vice-President Omar Suleiman was particularly unacceptable to Field Marshall Tantawi (see Egypt Update 20, Paragraph 38).

- Running a pro-military establishment candidate for the presidency to oppose the MB was worth trying, but subject to assessing the popularity of the MB and the negative reactions of the pro-democracy movement. If the military’s candidate, in this case Lieutenant-General (Ret.) Ahmad Shafik (see Egypt Update 18), former Chief of Staff of the Air Force and Mubarak’s last
appointed Prime Minister,\textsuperscript{12} was not too much opposed by these forces (MB and pro-democracy), the military establishment would back him, otherwise it would back off. He was not, and so the SCAF pulled the rug from underneath him. Shafik obtained 12.3 million votes and Morsi 13.2 million votes. But by then it was clear that if Shafik had been declared the winner, and that was possible if the military would have openly put their weight behind him as they have recently done for el-Sisi, Shafik would have won. But a Shafik victory, backed by the military, would have meant civil war with the MB and pro-democracy forces joining. This would have meant thousands of deaths and injuries and it would have discredited the military. So, they sacrificed Shafik at the altar of democracy, and gained legitimacy and popularity to come back as they did when the opportunity arose – and this occurred beginning with June 30, 2014 and a formal takeover by the military on July 3, 2013.

- Having allowed Morsi to succeed in the 2012 presidential election, they tested the MB’s skills at the helm of the nation, with the relative certainty that it would only be a matter of time before the MB would fail to address the ills of the nation and become unpopular. What a great way that would be for the military to be called back to power, as did eventually happen. The military establishment made things difficult for the MB, who faced many crises and failed to adequately address them, let alone resolve them. As a former secret organization, they were ill equipped to run a country.

- With some popular manipulations, the military managed to bring about the June 30, 2013 popular demand for Morsi’s ousting and the removal of any vestiges of an MB political power-base. What followed was a very transparent scenario that moved with military precision, and in a disciplined sequence of events. Things were
well planned and executed by General Intelligence and military intelligence, led by then Major-General el-Sisi. The outcomes occurred as anticipated with some inevitable exceptions, even for the best-laid plans. There were two such unexpected developments, namely the persistence of the MB in their opposition and their use of violence, and the continued peaceful opposition of the pro-democracy forces. The two separate opposition forces were relentless, and the Security Forces (police) consistently used excessive force and were clumsy. How much of that the military establishment anticipated is unknown. But what can be assumed is that even if the Security Forces got out of control, the military could blame them and come out of it relatively clean. In other words, excesses by the police were accepted so long as they did not lead to more problems, and that if that occurred, then the police would be blamed and the military could even be seen once again as the nation’s savior. It was a win-win situation that proved accurate.

- Geopolitical factors were surely also anticipated and surely also assessed to be in favor of the military. That too proved correct. There were two factors, however, that went in an opposite direction to what the military establishment had probably anticipated. The first was that the U.S. would support the Morsi presidency and government. The military establishment measured the White House’s reactions to the MB from what they heard from their counterparts in the U.S. military and intelligence communities, the latter being historically anti-MB. What they and their U.S. counterparts had not properly assessed, however, were the reactions of the U.S. National Security Council and those close to President Obama whose commitment to democracy and human rights trumped geopolitical considerations. The result was the suspension of U.S. military and economic aid, which in turn led to the loss of U.S. popularity in Egypt, and to an opening for Russia’s
first re-entry into Egypt since President Sadat asked U.S.S.R. military advisors to leave Egypt in 1973. What neither the Egyptian military establishment, nor for that matter probably the U.S. military and intelligence communities, anticipated was the shift in U.S. strategic interests in the Arab World after Susan Rice assumed the NCS’s leadership. This was inevitable after the disastrous policies in Iraq and Afghanistan, the prospects of a new U.S. involvement in the region, and particularly with the worsening of the civil war in Syria. This may well have led to the shift in U.S.-Iran relations. All of this caused Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States to react negatively to the U.S. and to seek Egypt’s reinforcement and its military strength. This not only allowed Egypt to receive substantial economic assistance from the Gulf States, but also to start reassessing its strategic relations with the U.S. and its reliance on it as its sole military supplier. Russia saw an opportunity after July 3, 2013 when the military establishment clearly took the nation’s helm. It offered to become a supplier of air force and air defense systems to Egypt, and Saudi Arabia agreed to pay. A potential 4 billion dollar deal is in the making.\footnote{13} As predicted by this writer in Egypt Update 25, Paragraph 8, Russia would surely exploit what it saw as the naïveté of the Obama administration. If this deal goes through and Russia puts a foot in Egypt, the geopolitical situation in the region may change significantly. Russia may even pull its fleet from the Syrian Mediterranean ports to put it in Egyptian ports, as anticipated in the Egypt Update cited above. The same scenario occurred in the mid-fifties, and the Russians had a dominant position in Egypt until 1973 when President Sadat asked them to leave. Other events in the Middle-East indicate further shifts in U.S. policy, particularly as it relates to the U.S. role in the Syria crisis and the internal conflict in Iraq in which the U.S. has unexpectedly, and
inexplicably, taken a pro-Shi‘ā position and provided Apache fighter helicopters to assist the Maliki Shi‘ā against the Sunni in Anbar province.\(^\text{14}\)

The wreckage of a tour bus that was targeted by a suicide bombing sits in the Egyptian resort town of Taba on February 16, 2014. (Photo credit: Khaled Desouki / AFP/Getty Images)

Soldiers and relatives carried the coffin of Ahmed Abul Atta, an Egyptian pilot killed when his military helicopter was shot down in the Sinai on January 6, 2014. (Photo Credit: Mohamed Rashed/Almasry Alyoum/European Pressphoto Agency)

Egyptian security forces arrest suspected militants after a firefight at the al-Goura settlement in Egypt’s north Sinai region on August 12, 2012. Egyptian troops killed as many as six Islamist militants after storming their hideout at the settlement. (Photo credit: Reuters/Stringer)

- Another unexpected factor by the Egyptian military in its strategic assessment of 2011 is the persistence of the guerrilla warfare in the Sinai between the Second Egyptian army and the Islamist group Ansar Beit al-Baqdis. This militant group is composed of pro-MB forces from Gaza, al-Qaeda affiliated forces from other Arab states,
and Sinai Bedouins fighting for local considerations. Notwithstanding the fact that Israel has allowed an increase in troops and military equipment, the Egyptian forces are embattled. On the occasion of the January 25 anniversary, four soldiers were killed and 11 injured. On January 26, 2014 militants shot down an Egyptian military helicopter. Most recently, on February 16, 2014 at least two tourists and an Egyptian driver were killed in a bomb explosion targeting a tourist bus, the first such attack on tourists in over three years. All of this has been anticipated in Egypt Updates 24, 25, and 26. In a perverse sense, the Sinai attacks and the spill-over effects of that theater of operations into the rest of the Sinai and Egypt proper, may turn out to the benefit of the military establishment, which is seen as the nation’s defender.

10. In January 2011, the military establishment had to deal with a difficult and tactically unpredictable situation, and it made an accurate assessment in 2011 of what was to happen, leading to their full return to power in 2013 as in the 1950s. All of this was predicted by this writer in Egypt Updates 24, 25 and 26, and will be discussed further in Part II. By 2013, most Egyptians had grown to dislike the Morsi government and the MB, and some say that secretly the military establishment facilitated the failures of Morsi and the MB. This was the time for

This July 26, 2013 photo shows opponents of Egypt's ousted President Mohammed Morsi protesting in Tahrir Square. (Photo credit: Reuters/Mohamed Abd El Ghany)
the return to power, but based on popular demand – and that was easily orchestrated. On June 30, 2013 an estimated 13 million people took to the streets and an electronic petition with an estimated 20 million names was being circulated. General el-Sisi called for a popular mandate to “confront terrorism” in a speech on July 24, 2013. Three weeks later, President Morsi was arrested and taken to an undisclosed location, to be later put on trial (see Egypt Update 20, Paragraph 9 and Egypt Update 25, Paragraphs 10-15). Since then the policies of repression against the MB and the pro-democracy movement have been ongoing, as described in Egypt Updates 24, 25, and 26, dated respectively October 31, 2013, December 7, 2013, and January 12, 2014.

11. After June 30, 2013 demonstrations by the MB in cities throughout the country continued almost on a daily basis with deaths, injuries and arrests accompanying them. As of January 27, 2014, Morsi and other senior leaders of the MB are on trial in a courtroom at the Police Academy where Mubarak and others of his regime had been previously tried (see Egypt Update 25, Paragraph 10). The process came to a full circle. Yesterday’s accusers became today’s accused. A certain poetic symmetry is obvious, but also transparent. Mubarak is surely going to be found innocent and freed. His two sons probably will receive the same treatment. But not so for Morsi and the MB leadership. They are likely to go to prison for long terms, and the death penalty is a possibility. On February 9, 2014, Temporary President Adly Mansour confirmed the death penalty for 15 MB accused of “terrorism.”

Former Egyptian Presidents Hosni Mubarak and Mohamed Morsi as they appeared in the defendant’s cage on trial, in June 2012 and January 2014 respectively. (Photo credit left: Associated Press; Photo credit right: Almasry Alyoum/European Pressphoto Agency)
12. After July 13, 2013 when the military establishment took over and proclaimed a new “Temporary President” on the following day, the repression by the Security Forces and the military forces increased. In time it also included the pro-democracy forces. As the military establishment had accurately predicted, popular sentiment was on their side. The anti-MB and pro-democracy repression was tactically led by Minister of the Interior, Police General Mohamed Ibrahim, and strategically led by the head of General Intelligence, Major-General (Ret.) Mohamed Farid el-Tohamy, who has the rank of Minister.\(^\text{19}\) The Ministry of Interior, as under Habib el-Adly’s former leadership, resorted to their same abusive tactics against any and all demonstrations since June 30, 2013.\(^\text{20}\) An estimated 1,000 civilians were killed and 4,000 injured between January 25 and 27, 2013, in the span of 72 hours.\(^\text{21}\) The estimated number of dead and injured from January 2011 until June 2013 is easily in the thousands (well over 1,000 deaths and nearly 6,467 injuries according to some official figures, although human rights organizations believe that to be a very conservative number). Between June 30, 2013 and the present, there have been over 1,400 killed.\(^\text{22}\)

13. The Prosecutor-General’s office frequently acted injudiciously and abusively as it had under the Mubarak regime. As stated above, the security forces arrested an estimated 26,000 persons in the last three years; prosecutors subsequently validated their arrests. Thousands were charged and tried. No one knows the exact number. Many of the charges are questionable. Fourteen have been sentenced to death, and several hundreds to several years of imprisonment. Morsi and the MB leadership of 15 are on trial for what appears to be mostly absurd charges of espionage and others. Some charges, such as incitement to violence, are arguably valid, though the defense can certainly argue that use of force against a military coup is justified, as is resistance against the removal of a lawfully elected head of state. The judiciousness of such trials leaves much to be desired, to say the least.

14. The government has not released figures on the number of people dead, injured, or arrested. It also does not provide information on, of those arrested, how many have been kept in detention, how many were released, or how many
were prosecuted (whether in civil or military court). Further, the government does not release, either by incident or cumulatively, information on the number of security officers killed or injured in confrontations. The Regime’s repression encompassed both the MB and the pro-democracy movement. This is clear by what the future prospects are, particularly after the referendum on the new constitution.

15. It has now been three years since a popular uprising erupted against the Mubarak regime, which for most Egyptians represented corruption, brutality and a general lack of respect for human rights. The Mubarak regime, like its predecessors, the Sadat and Nasser regimes, had a military as well as a political establishment. For most of that time the military ran the country from behind the scenes, with the General Intelligence Agency being the dominant governing body. They engaged in arbitrary arrests and detentions as well as tortures and disappearances. Their work was supplemented by the police’s State Security Investigations Service (Mabahith Amn al-Dawla). After 2005, under Minister of Interior Habib el-Adly, this department took over most of the political repression work. Generally speaking, Interior Minister el-Adly and his senior leadership had a total disregard for the law and for the people. They used all of the repressive powers of the police and those of the Prosecutor’s Office (whom they influenced significantly) to engage in massive arbitrary arrests, torture, and other human rights abuses against the MB and anyone else who dared oppose the government and the oligarchs. El-Adly and his subordinates were truly the servants of a corrupt oligarchy, and in exchange, they came to acquire a new political, social, and economic status in the country. They were reputed to have received the largest amounts of bonuses and benefits of any security force or public employee in the country and they were beyond accountability for any violations including torture and killings under torture. Not much seems to have changed. In January 2014, prosecutors charged seven activists for posting signs urging people to vote “no” in the constitutional referendum held on January 14 and 15, 2014. On December 22, 2013, Ahmed Maher, a leader of the April 6 Movement, along with two other high-profile activists, Mohamed Adel and Ahmed Douma, were
sentenced to three years in prison and a fine of 50,000 Egyptian Pounds (roughly 7,180 USD), for organizing a demonstration before the People’s Assembly to protest a law infringing on freedom of assembly, which was passed on November 24, 2013. During that demonstration, 79 other pro-democracy activists were arrested, including 10 women. On January 5, 2014, a court imposed a one-year suspended sentence on Mona Seif, a popular activist known for her campaigns against torture, police brutality, and the use of military courts in civilian matters. She and 11 other activists, including Ālāʿa Abdul-Fatah, were convicted for participating in an illegal demonstration. On February 5, 2014, Egyptian authorities released the names of 20 journalists being held on “terrorism” charges, with nine out of the 20 being Al Jazeera journalists. They are to go on trial on February 20. The total estimated number of persons arrested since July 3, 2013 to date is about 20,000 persons, although it is believed that no more than 4,000 are still in custody. On February 2, 2014, a court in Cairo acquitted 61 pro-Morsi demonstrators and a photographer from Al Jazeera. They had been arrested during demonstrations that occurred in July 2013. The Security Forces and the Prosecutor’s Office have also targeted labor unions. On December 18, 2013, the headquarters of the Egyptian Center for Economic and Social Rights, an NGO that focuses on socio-economic issues, particularly labor rights, was raided by 50 armed men in civilian attire, later determined to be police. Six members of its staff were detained, and a number of items and documents were seized. In July and August of 2013, workers who had taken part in a strike against the Suez Steel Company for employee dismissals and the failure to pay salaries and other employee benefits, were arrested and had their homes searched. The arrests were used as a bargaining chip in order to pressure the workers to end their strike.

An unexpected casualty of the Security Forces repressive practices were Syrian refugees. The have experienced a backlash since the ousting of Morsi in June 2013 on the assumption that they were Morsi supporters. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that there are 300,000 Syrian refugees in Egypt. After the events in June 2013, Syrians were accused of taking part in the pro-Morsi demonstrations. Several media figures appealed to viewers
to attack Palestinians and Syrians, painting them as pro-Morsi and as wanting to destabilize the country. Authorities began to treat Syrians as a security risk, and Syrians attempting to flee the civil war in their country were denied visas to enter into Egypt. Many Syrian refugees already living in Egypt, but who did not have visas, were subsequently arrested. UNHCR reports that by July 26, 2013, at least 476 Syrians had been detained, although it estimates that the actual figure is much higher. In addition to Syrians and Palestinians, sub-Saharan African refugees, mostly from Eritrea, have been consistently kidnapped, tortured for ransom and killed by traffickers, according to a recent report by Human Rights Watch. These abuses have been consistently denied by Egyptian authorities, who have made the Sinai a safe haven for abusive traffickers.

17. The SCAF is firmly in control of the country and there is no question in anyone’s mind as to that. A large majority of the people is exhausted by the instability of the last three years and wants stability at all costs. This is why they support the repression of the MB and the pro-democracy forces, and also want Field Marshal el-Sisi to run for president. The military regime now in power has much popular support among a large segment of the population.

III. Political Perspectives

18. If by the end of 2011 it was not clear that the January 25, 2011 Revolution had ended, it was surely the case by the end of 2013. The June 30, 2013 popular move was against the MB but not pro-democracy. The people genuinely want stability even at the price of sacrificing democracy. Polarization became almost total among Egyptians, and it all became a zero-sum game. No side saw the other’s position, and each side engaged in labeling. Part of this process was to label anyone who is MB, pro-democracy, or who opposes the police’s use of force a terrorist. No principled opposition was acceptable. The polarization had reached such a level that public hospitals are reported to refuse treatment for injured demonstrators, and that apparently goes back to August 2013. Deaths,
injuries, and arrests continue with every new event, and that includes arresting any critics, including foreign and domestic journalists.

19. The next political step is the expected presidential election, which as predicted in Egypt Update 23, Paragraphs 60 and 64, resulted in the candidacy of Field Marshal el-Sisi. (See also Egypt Update 24, Paragraph 9; Egypt Update 20, Paragraphs 7 and 9; and Egypt Update 21, Summary Section). Field Marshal el-Sisi confirmed that he would run in the presidential elections in an interview with a Kuwaiti newspaper on February 6, 2014. He will likely resign his military position, which was advanced on January 27, 2014 by a Presidential Decree from Temporary President Adly Mansour, promoting him to Field Marshal. On that same day, the SCAF officially gave el-Sisi the mandate to run. The media and street talk have considered it as a fait accompli since July 2013. His informal announcement on February 5 was therefore uneventful. On February 5, Field Marshal el-Sisi announced that he was bowing to popular demand and to the wishes of the SCAF, and running for the presidency. His picture in uniform is already all over the country. But to date, he has not made a formal announcement that would have to be accompanied by his resignation as Minister of Defense, Chair of the SCAF, and of his military status and rank. This will likely soon occur. Judging from the result of the Constitutional Referendum held on January 14 and 15, 2014 (though only 38.6% of the eligible voters participated), el-Sisi will receive an overwhelming number of votes. It is not know whether the MB will abstain or support another candidate. If the MB supports another candidate, it is likely to be General (Ret.) Sami Hafez Anan, former Chief of Staff of the SCAF under Field Marshal Tantawi. President Morsi on August 12, 2012, when he appointed General el-Sisi as Minister of Defense and promoted him from Major-General to full General, removed both. Presidential elections are scheduled for April 2014. Legislative elections will follow and they will produce a legislative body dominated by pro-“Regime” persons. The fact that the Regime is hard at work to produce these results and to insure the election of el-Sisi does not detract from the fact that there is a strong popular support for el-Sisi and strong popular dislike for the MB. This requires, inter alia, a determined public
commitment on the part of the people to work for change and improvement. The election of el-Sisi, no matter how popular, is going to be an important step toward stability, but it is not going to be enough to change things.

20. In the past three years Egyptians have demonstrated how politically conscious they are and how much they are committed to Egypt as a nation and desirous of achieving democracy and a socially just system. They rejected the MB theocracy; they rose up and then welcomed a military-backed regime as a transition to democracy in the future. From the numbers who descended in the streets and communicated through the social media, there appeared to be 30 million involved in this process. Considering that Egypt has an estimated 85 million population, 30 million politically active persons, mostly under 40 years of age is quite telling.

21. The MB’s political party, Ḥizb Al-Hurriya Wal-ʿAdala, Freedom and Justice Party, has been popularly discredited before it was implicitly declared illegal by the Constitution, Article 54 which bans religious political parties. Presumably this should also apply to the Salafist Al-Nour party, but because of their support for the Regime and their backing by Saudi Arabia, that party’s status is in limbo. The Salafists publicly urged a ‘yes’ vote in the constitutional referendum held in January 2014, and they managed to stay out of the confrontation between the MB and the Regime, but as stated above, future confrontation is predictable.

22. The MB has pursued a multiple-track strategy of: peaceful demonstrations and protests, occasional violent confrontations with the security forces, and outright violence that falls within the meaning of “terrorism”. The first two-prongs of the strategy is to elicit a repressive reaction by the Security Forces and thus to obtain public sympathy at home and abroad. The third prong is more complex. It involves direct violence that is carried out by groups claimed by the MB to be separate. Throughout their history the MB have pursued this rather transparent approach. They have become adept at that, particularly during the 1970s and the 1990s. During these periods it was reported that the security apparatus negotiated with the MB to bring down the violence, particularly after it
had targeted tourism in the 1990s. As stated in Egypt Update 22, Paragraph 16, the MB has been reported to have a “secret organization”, Tanzim Serri, which is organized on the basis of interconnected cells, such as was the case in Communist organizations in different non-Communist countries since the 1950s. They will continue their resistance and will continue to fight. They have strong support in Egypt, in several Arab countries, and throughout the world. But they too in time will change and maybe recognize the value of some democracy and less theocracy. Ideologies such as theirs are necessarily subject to generational changes, particularly in the era of globalization that we live in.

23. The MB has been marginalized and has been driven underground, much as they have all throughout their history. The only remaining Islamist group is the Salafists, whose organization is mainly located in Alexandria and whose political party is el-Nour. No one knows exactly how many members they have, but they were able to produce at least 1 million votes at the 2011 legislative elections. Leadership in Saudi Arabia, which funds them, has always guided the Egyptian Salafists. They have always been supportive of the Mubarak regime and seldom been the subjects of any repressive measures by the state security apparatus under Mubarak, or for that matter under the present Regime. Many in the military are considered to share their values, including Field Marshal el-Sisi and General Tohamy. They are seen by the Regime as the hope for improving deteriorating social values in Egypt. But they are likely to surprise the Regime as their Islamist goals start to surface. I am convinced that the rank and file of the Salafists will press for some form of theocracy. Already they are critical of the 2014 Constitution, which has removed Article 219 of the 2012 Constitution that gave the Ulema the right to decide on whether a given law conformed to the Sharia.

24. In the meantime, Egypt will have to face serious economic problems, as described throughout all of these Updates in the last three years. The new el-Sisi Regime will soon face these difficulties. Saudi Arabia will help financially, as will the U.S. militarily and strategically (particularly if Russia is competing with the U.S. for influence in Egypt and the larger Arab world). Geopolitically, Egypt will be a necessary balance to Iran’s new influence in the region given the
strategic alliance between the U.S. and Iran – one imperial power recognizing the aspirations of another older imperial power which for a while, however, did not have the opportunity to extend its tentacles into the Arab world. But neither the U.S. nor Iran realize the deep-seated animosity that the Arab Sunni have for the Shi'a and especially for Iran. If nothing else, Iran more than Israel will unify the Arab world that will henceforth become the Arab/Muslim/Salafist world. This will surely buy time for the U.S. and Israel and it will likely marginalize the Palestinian issue once again, but it is not likely to bring stability to the Arab world as the U.S. naively hopes. Iran, however, is an old and wily imperial power that knows how to play its cards more wisely than the U.S. does. And it will attempt to find ways to avoid confrontation with the Sunni Muslim Arab world. But respite does not mean much of coexistence.

25. The new President, presumably Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, will have to face the high hopes and expectations among the majority of the population. But this of course means a higher challenge. As is well known, the higher the expectations in the face of existing social, political, and economic problems, the less likely they are to be met. The outcome is likely to be disappointment, which will affect the popularity of el-Sisi and of the military. Nevertheless for the time being, the level of popular optimism with the Regime supporters is running high.

26. And so it is that on the occasion of the third anniversary of what has to be described as a glorious revolutionary effort, that one must regrettably announce its demise. But few who have participated in that effort or witnessed it will ever forget the sense of freedom and empowerment that the people had when in a matter of weeks they were able to bring down Hosni Mubarak from the presidency. Like the 1919 Revolution, it took time for Egypt to become an independent state and to be freed from British colonial occupation. That revolutionary spirit was rekindled on January 25, 2011. Even though it did not succeed in bringing about democracy, freedom, and the rule of law, it was not in vain and it is not all over. The torch of freedom has not been extinguished although its light has been dimmed. In the course of time it will be rekindled again.
IV. Historical Reflections

27. The natural enclave through which the Nile runs is protected by the desert along its western border, the Red Sea on its Eastern flank, the Mediterranean to the north, and the wide swamps called “sudud” (barriers) to the south. Writing in approximately 450 BCE the Greek historian Herodotus called Egypt the “gift of the Nile.” And so it has been for what is believed to be this 7,000 year old civilization. Indeed without the Nile and its narrow valley up to the delta, Egypt would never have existed. In a symbolic way the Nile delta is the shape of a pyramid, Egypt’s symbol since the main pyramids were built at Giza in approximately 2,560 BCE (though earlier and more primitive ones had been built in Nubia some 1000 years earlier).

28. By analogy, Egypt’s pharaohs still keep coming, though few of the modern ones have left much, if anything, behind them except abuses and harms of all sorts. None of these modern pharaohs stood as tall as Ramesses II whose glory still illuminates Egypt’s history, even though some tried. Gamal Abdel Nasser was the closest aspirant. He died in 1970 of a heart attack in the aftermath of the infamous 1967 defeat that saw the Sinai lost to Israel. The defeat occurred at the very place where in 1,268 BCE Ramesses II defeated the Hittites at the Battle of Kadesh. In an ironic twist of history the Israeli General Moshe Dayan, who in 1967 engineered Egypt’s defeat, called it “Operation Kadesh.” After Nasser’s heart attack in 1970, Anwar El Sadat succeeded him and took on the mantle of Ramesses II by winning a partial victory in the October 1973 surprise attack across the Suez Canal into the Sinai on Yom Kippur. But the Egyptian foothold was soon overtaken by an Israeli counter attack that crossed the Suez Canal in the opposite direction, cutting off the Egyptian Third Army from the Second Army. The former found itself encircled from the West and the East. A political settlement orchestrated by Henry Kissinger, then U.S. Secretary of State, saved the situation before the Third Army would have had to surrender, having been left
for days without food and water and without the prospects of being saved by any other Egyptian force. Nevertheless Egypt has since celebrated the success of the October War on an annual basis. As years went by, the event reinforced the public belief of Egypt’s military supremacy over Israel.

29. At the annual parade of 1981 commemorating the Egyptian crossing of the Suez, infantry First Lieutenant Khalid Islambouli, whose brother died under torture during Anwar Sadat’s tenure, assassinated President Sadat. He only had three soldiers with him, and yet in the midst of thousands of parading and guarding officers and soldiers they managed to kill the “Pharaoh.” Sadat must have thought it odd as his assassin broke rank and approached the platform on which he was standing. In fact, Sadat appeared to salute the young man moments before the first volley of grenades were tossed into the stand. Only one of the first three grenades thrown exploded, but immediately thereafter Islambouli and his men began firing assault rifles in the general direction of Sadat and his party. Vice President Hosni Mubarak was standing next to Sadat at the time of the attack, as was the Minister of Defense Field Marshal Mohammad Abou-Ghazala. They were both slightly injured and left alive because the attackers contemptuously spared them.

30. In time, these commemorative parades of October 23 took on more and more significance. General Abdul Fattah el-Sisi (now Field Marshal as of 2014), Egypt’s present ruler as Minister of Defense and Chairman of the SCAF oversaw
the one of October 2013. This year was indeed the grandest of all such commemorative celebrations. It included the presence of Nasser’s daughter and Sadat’s widow. What greater symbolism could there have been to link together the past and the present? But as the parade ended and the crowds faded away, there was nothing left on the ground but emptiness, harshly echoing the silent statues and tombs that dot so much of Egypt’s Nile banks, from south of Cairo to the north of the Sudan.

31. Unlike Nasser and Sadat, Mubarak did not die in power, but fell from it in disgrace. His mediocrity and corrupt oligarchy drained Egypt not only of its economic strength but also of its social vitality and political life. The successor to that dynasty, Field Marshal el-Sisi, appears to be a shy and modest person, devout and strong willed, yet sentimental and definitely a political leader. To continue using the pharaonic analogy, he is not likely going to claim to be “King”, let alone “King of Kings” as some have in the past. He will, however, surely rule as president with the same decisiveness and strong hand that he has displayed since June 30, 2013, and for that matter, since January 25, 2011 when he was head of Military Intelligence. His picture hangs in homes and public places along with some resurrected Nasser pictures that had disappeared during the Sadat and Mubarak eras. The symbolism is uncanny. Both Nasser and el-Sisi have appealed to the dignity of Egyptians, something so dear to those who have so little but the dream of regaining their dignity, clinging to the illusion that by some miracle another military dictatorship will restore it. Alas, this is not likely to be the case, as Egypt has already started its slow descent in the quick sands of exponential demographic growth and economic decline (to be addressed in Part II). What it will take to pull the nation out of this situation is hard to foresee. So far, there is nothing to indicate that those in power have made an assessment of what the situation is and what it would take to stop the decline. Without a plan, it is indeed difficult to see how things can change. But then, as the late President Sadat once told me at his home in Mit Abu al-Kum in 1974, “Egypt has survived for 7,000 years, and will live for a long time to come.” The whimsical implication being that Egypt will go on surviving because of its people’s
resilience and survival capabilities. Egyptians are indeed resourceful, imaginative, and adaptable. Whether these traits are sufficient to overcome the present and future challenges is the question no one can yet answer. But hope springs eternal, and Egyptians are by temperament hopeful and optimistic. One example of this was the recent damage to the Museum of Islamic Art and the National Archives. Housed in the same building, these depositories of history were severely damaged in one of the car bombs detonated in Cairo on January 24, 2014. Irreplaceable artifacts from Islam’s Golden Age as well as invaluable papyrus scrolls were lost to a bomb that was meant to target the police building across the street. In the face of this great loss, however, Egyptians displayed their customary resolve. Volunteers rushed to the blast site, financial aid is already being sought, and restoration of the facilities has begun without delay.  

Restorers work inside the Museum of Islamic Art in Cairo. Published on January 31, 2014, approximately one week after the explosion. (Photo credit: Ahmed Gamil/Associated Press)

32. Revolutions are characterized by chaos and violence. How much and how long differs from one revolution to the next. Invariably the high and mighty of
prior times fall from their pedestals of power only to be succeeded by new ones who in turn also fall from their newly acquired pedestals. Public and private abuses take place and much harm and wrong occurs in the name of a revolution. Truth and justice are distorted, and human beings suffer the consequences. The processes and outcomes of all revolutions are uncannily similar, no matter what the differences in means and methods may be.

33. History teaches us that it takes many convulsions for a nation in turmoil to settle down along a path that aspires to democracy and freedom. The pace depends on how fast a rule of law system can be built to sustain democracy and freedom. Egypt is no different as it now goes through yet another phase of revolutionary convulsion since it all began on January 25, 2011. The Egyptian revolution, like many others in history, started with idealistic people of all walks of life motivated by the principles of democracy, freedom, and justice. They, like their many other predecessors throughout history, sought political, social, and economic justice after decades of tyranny, repression, and exploitation. The question that many Egyptians ask is whether the change with the new presidential elections of 2014 and the legislative elections whose dates have not yet been announced are likely to be steps in the direction of democracy, or whether they will just be cosmetic changes so that nothing substantively changes.

1 Eugene Fisher and M. Cherif Bassiouni, Storm over the Arab World (1972).
2 Which the US Constitution refers to as inalienable rights: “We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” (Thomas Jefferson).
3 Habib El-Adly was convicted in June 2012 for having participated in the killing of protesters during the 2011 uprising, and was sentenced to life in prison along with Hosni Mubarak. See BBC News, Mubarak sentenced to jail for life over protest deaths, June 2, 2012, available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-18306126.
4 Egypt is a state-party to the Convention Against Torture, and torture is a crime in Egypt’s Criminal Code.
7 See Article 219 of the 2012 Egyptian Constitution.
8 It was rumored at the time that Lieutenant-General (Ret.) Ahmad Shafik, Mubarak last appointed P.M. (who was formerly Chief of Staff of the Air Force), who was Morsi’s opponent, was about to win. That was my prediction in Egypt Update 16 dated May 2012, para 25. The final tally of the vote gave Morsi about 882,000 votes more than Shafik for a total of 13.2 million votes. Had Shafik won, the MB would have protested with force and the military would have had to intervene. This would have produced too large a number of casualties, and it was best to let the MB win and then fall all over their faces. And so it was.


10 Four bombings throughout Cairo left six people dead, and clashes with police killed at least eight. The first and deadliest of the explosions was a suicide attack that killed four people and injured 70 in downtown Cairo. The second explosion was at a metro station in the area of Dokki, on the west bank of the Nile. Police reported that the explosion came from a bomb hidden in a bag. One security officer was killed and eight persons were injured in the attack. The third attack occurred outside a police station near the pyramids, but caused no casualties or injuries. The fourth explosion occurred near a cinema in Giza, killing one person and injuring four. Although many initially blamed the Muslim Brotherhood for the attacks, the bombings followed the patterns of the Sinai-based terrorist group Ansar Bait al-Maqdis, who had issued an audio message the night before promising there would be attacks on police and army targets. The Muslim Brotherhood denied any part of the attacks and issued a statement condemning them as “cowardly” and called for swift investigations. Al Jazeera, Cairo rocked by deadly bomb attacks, January 24, 2014, available at: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/01/cairo-rocked-deadly-bomb-attacks-2014124103138914258.html.


12 The military establishment undermined the candidacy of Omar Suleiman for the same reason of persona dislike by Field Marshal Tantawi who had previously blocked Suleiman access to the presidency. See Egypt Update 20, para 38, dated July 17, 2013.


14 On October 29, 2013, Iraqi President el-Malki came to the US on an official state visit. He asked President Obama for military assistance to fight the Sunni who rebel against his Shiʿa pro-Iranian government, using, however, the argument that al-Qaeda linked forces are behind it. For the US to support a pro-Iranian Shiʿa government in Iraq is to say the least counterproductive with respect to the rest of the Arab world, which is strongly suspicious of Iran and the Arab Shiʿa.


16 Recently, there have been arrests and detentions of prominent activists, such as Ala’a Abdel-Fattah. There have also been orders of prosecution for a number of pro-democracy figures, such as Amr Hamzawy, a former Member of Parliament and former researcher at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Emad Shahin, who previously taught at Harvard and at the American University in Cairo, and who was listed among some 130 defendants, including Mohamed Morsi, on charges of conspiring with foreign militant groups to destabilize Egypt.

17 The difference, however, is that when Morsi appeared in court on January 29, 2014 – his second appearance since his ouster – he was locked in a glass, soundproof cage, as opposed to Mubarak being held behind the bars of a metal cage, resting on a movable hospital bed. This was presumably because during his first appearance, he had yelled out in protest. This type of treatment is unprecedented in Egyptian courts. Other MB leaders on trial in the same case were also kept in separate glass cages. At a court appearance on February 16, 2014, Morsi’s lawyers walked out of court in protest of Morsi and other defendents being held in glass cages.

18 The pro-democracy forces believe that the military’s comeback is accompanied by a return of the feloul, and that means former Mubarak supporters. This is reinforced by the appearance of pictures of Mubarak at some Regime-sponsored demonstrations. Mubarak’s conviction was reversed by the Supreme Court (See Egypt Update 17, para 4, dated July 2, 2012; and Egypt Update 23, para 59 dated September 19, 2013). He has since been confined to a hospital in Cairo and is likely to be released soon. None of the persons who had been arrested or brought to trial in the past three years for corruption or abuse of power are now in prison, save for Gamal Mubarak, the former president’s younger son, businessman and ex-official for the former ruling party, ‘Ala’a Mubarak, the former
president’s elder son, former Minister of Interior Habib el-Adly, former Tourism Minister Zuhair Garranah, and Ahmed Ezz, steel tycoon and ex-official for the former ruling party.


21 In a perverse way, this was almost the same number of persons security forces killed as they cracked down on sit-ins held by supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood between August 14-18, 2013, after President Morsi was removed from office and arrested, although many more were killed and injured since Morsi’s ouster than in those four days. Since July 3, 2013, more than 1,400 have been killed, mostly due to the excessive use of force by security forces.


28 A new election law is to be decreed by the Temporary President before the end of February, and the registration for presidential candidates will follow. This means that el-Sisi may announce his candidacy mid-March for elections to be held mid-April.

